fi'e"Se"" .t makes ·t ain in on tra.- [(p ... 'exaddi t: ion, i.e. p -+ (p v q), It is clear that related~ ness logic is different from relevance logic --see \'ialton (19..79 1. Either there will be evidence for the arguer's intentions regarding conclusiveness in the wording of his argument, or there wi l l not. In the fi r s t case, intentions and "purported validity" or "involving a claim to validity" (Copi) will amount to much the same thing . There are numerous examples, as Fohr admits, where wo r ding is not helpful. After all, conclusiveness in the sense of logical entailment is a philosopher's concept, and even such English words as "must" , "therefore", and "shows concl usively" will not prov ide a reliable basis for inferring that the arguer is claiming conclusiveness in the sense that the premises are supposed to lo~ically ential the conclusion . If, on the ot er hand, we seek to avoid these difficulties with wording--making the author's ~a~so and that alone the criterion for determ~n~n g his intention--we will find ourselves unable to apply the distinction to many cases where authors are dead or absent. This is absurd if the inductiye/deductive distinction is supposed to be a fundamental tool in the assessment of argument . We can , of course, look at the indeterminate arguments "both ways", as Fohr suggests; but the more ofte n we do this, the more often we are bound to· wonder why all of logic should have been erected around this fuzzy distinction in the first place.
2 . If we really take Fohr seri ously on the over-riding importance of intention, then we will have to accept the peculiar consequence that there are inductive arguments which a r e deductively valid, and deductive arguments which are inductively strong. For instance , suppose someone argues: l. Either Levesque will be defeated at the next election, or he will win and call another refer endum . 2. Since Quebecers are fond of Levesque , he will not be defeated at the ne xt election. 3. Thus, there will in all likelihood be another referendum. This argument is deductively valid, but the conclusion contains the tentative expression "in all likelihood". If the arguer is a logically untutored person, he may deem himself to have provided only some good reasons for thinking there will be another referendum; he may not realize that his statements contain a perfect disjunctive syllogism, which, of course, is deductively valid. (A perfectly sensible reason for such a person to take this view would be the fact that the first premise is by no means certain; sensing this, one might express his conclusion hesitantly.) Thus the intention will be 'inductive', despite the fact that the argument is deductively valid. This consequence seems counterintuitive. Fohr might reply that we can assess an inductive argument by deductive criteria, and conversely, but: (a) his stress on intention suggests that he would not move in this direction, and (b) if he did, that in itself would cast doubt on the importance of the inductive/deductive distinction for practical criticism. If a deductive argument can be assessed by inductive standards, or an inducti ve argument by deductive standards, what is the point in calling th~ deductive or inductive in the first place?
3. Ordinary language is not nearly as strict wi th words like "conclusive" "shows", or even ~deduce" as is philosophical and logical tradition. I think that this may be the explanation for Conan Doyle's description of Sherlock Holmes as a great master of deduction. We sometimes use "deduce" loosely enough so that it means more or less what is meant by "infer" or "conclude from". I might, in that sense, deduce from your irritable d i sposition that you are tired today. I doubt that Conan Doyle ever meant to claim that Holmes's conclusions followed with logical necessity from the bits of evidence he had. Now I do not wish to propose here that ordinary language is entirely all right and that philosophers and logicians have been guilty of a pernicious distortion of it. The problem for Fohr is that the traditional notion of deductive logical validity or--as he puts it--conclusiveness or necessarr implication is one wh~ch philosophers and ogicians have constructed. It requires, first, a concept of logically necessary connection, and second, a distinction between considerations of truth and those of the connection between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. All of us know from teaching experience that it can be very difficult to convey these notions to philosophically untutored people; in fact, some never succeed in grasping them. Who is missing something here --us, or them? As a philosopher who values my own education, I am of course inclined to think they are, but in view of the doubts of Duhem, Quine, Waismann, and others, there are some grounds for scepticism here. If arguers' intentions are to provide the basis for ·a distinction between deductive and inductive arguments which will be anything like the traditional one, those arguers will have to formulate their intentions with a knowledge of the difference between logical and empirical connection, and the distinction between considerations of truth and those of validity. Now Fohr, like others. interested in informal logic, wants to attend to real arguments put forward by real people. This means not 8 only philosophers and logicians writing textbooks, but politicians, lawyers, housewives, historians, economists, psychologists, and others. Fohr says that the reason the inductive/deductive distinction should be preserved is that arguers should know whether they intend to offer conclusive tin the logician's sense) reasons for their claims, or not. But in view of the background which such intentions require, I am not sure that this is an entirely reasonable norm for the arguing public. Even if it is, the world at present is far from being in a condition where it could be realized. ~ost people who are out there constructing arguments do not have an acquaintance with. logic and philosophy. And as far as the logical/contingent aspect of the necessary background is concerned, philosophers do not have a sufficient consensus on this matter to launch an education program for the general public.
Despite all of this, I confess that there is something in me which shares Fohr's reluctance to scrap the distinction between inductive and deductive argumen~s. This reluctance may be purely the product of caution and education; one naturally hesitates to think that a distinction which has been around for so long, and around which so much teaching of logic has been organized, could simply be ill-founded. Those with doubts may be missing something--but what is it? Not, I would argue, a norm for arguers' intentions.
Referring to a suggestion of Carl Wellman's which I forwarded to the editors of the Newsletter in 1979, Fohr remarks that he can see no good reason to have more than two categories of argument. I do not wish to commit myself to Wellman's concept of a "conductive argument", but contra Fohr, I can see a reason for moving to more than two categories. (In categorizing one will, of course, have to ask what the categories are for, and their purpose should have something to do with how many we need.) The common modern sense of 'inductive' is so broad that all non-conclusive arguments are classified as inductive and hence in the same category. Yet inductive logic deals exclusively with the confirmation/disconfirmation of empirical hypotheses by empirical data on particulars. Now this combination of definition and focus can make people think that all arguments are either deductive or scientific-empirical-inductive.
Such a belief we inherit from positivism, and it is this legacy which makes people think that there cannot be arguments in support of moral judgements. The broad modern sense of induction found in, say, Copi and more or less endorsed by Fohr will leave the "inductive" category as a grab-bag holding everything from legal arguments, consequentialist moral or prudential reasoning, and scientific confirmation to philosophers' paradigm case arguments, transcendental arguments, and infinite regress arguments. To say that an a. rgument is inductive in the broad modern s·ense tells us virtually nothing about it and it is for this reason, I think, that the move to more than the two categories would be tempting. 
